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Abstract—This article will examine some of the ways that 
political leaders attempt to create, control, and otherwise manage 
national identity through language policy. This appraisal will be 
assisted by some historical and contemporary case studies 
demonstrating the use of language policy in this process, drawn 
from the Third Reich and Nazi-occupied Poland, Sri Lanka, and 
pre- and post-majority rule South Africa. This article reaches the 
general conclusion that it is possible to influence the formation of 
national identity through language policy by using language to: 
(i) define the identity boundary, (ii) identify the nation through
its prevailing ontology, and (iii) manage feelings—particularly
fears, doubts, and uncertainties—for selected purposes. Whether
a sense of national identity has been calmed or disturbed will
have implications for order or conflict, peace or war, and
accommodation or genocide.
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I. LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY
For individuals, a robust and well-integrated sense of 
identity is viewed by psychology as an important part of mental 
health. Identity can be defined as “a person’s essential, 
continuous self, the internal subjective concept of oneself as an 
individual” (Reber, 1995: 355) [1]—and the same can be 
applied to a nation. Identity is formed by identification, which 
Freud (1955: 105)[2] viewed as the earliest expression of a tie 
with another person. This position was developed by Erikson 
(1968) [3], who considered a strong sense of identity a 
necessary condition for a successfully functioning individual 
and nation. Erikson viewed a strong sense of identity as a 
generator of energy, and a weak or confused sense of identity 
as a source of decline. As a crisis of identity develops, 
powerful negative factors are produced that “arouse in man a 
hatred of ‘otherness’” (Erikson, 1968: 62) [3]. 
Identity at a collective level has been studied by many 
social scientists, especially in terms of national identity. 
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the concept of a 
collectivity as a group or community (Tollefsen, 2002 [4], 
Huebner, 2010) [5]. When considering the relationship between 
national identity and the individual, Smith (1991) [6] viewed 
national identity as having three functions: (i) providing a 
satisfying answer to the fear of oblivion through identification 
with a nation, (ii) offering personal renewal and dignity by 
becoming part of a political “super-family,” and (iii) enabling 
the realization of feelings of fraternity—especially through the 
use of symbols and ceremonies (Smith, 1991: 160-161) [6]. 
According to this view, identification is a powerful two-way 
link between individual and nation. When a sense of national 
identity is weak or divided, this will affect the functioning of 
the state.  
Thus, identity provides a link between the two concepts of 
state and nation. The state is an objective, politico-legal-
coercive entity, while the nation is a subjective, psychological 
construct. The disjunction between state and nation can be the 
cause of great tension and conflict, while the linkage between 
the two is identity.  
Identity (from the Latin “idem,” meaning “the same”) was 
first used in ancient times and later by medieval theologians 
and philosophers. More recently, it has been applied by 
psychologists. In addition, many poets, playwrights, novelists, 
composers, and other artists have given expression to 
statements of identity, and have subsequently had great 
influence on creating nations and states. Examples are the great 
nineteenth-century romantic poet, Adam Mickiewicz, who 
gave a new form to Polish identity, and the writer and political 
activist, Jose Rizal, who powerfully shaped Philippine 
identity—particularly after his execution.  
Marx showed himself to be an identity theorist when he 
wrote of class consciousness; however, the main impetus 
towards identity theory came from psychoanalysis, where it 
was seen as the basis of the socialization process by which 
societies are created. As Freud (1955: 105) [2] stated, 
“Identification is known to psychoanalysis as the earliest 
expression of an emotional tie with another person.” To Freud, 
identification was a mechanism by which a child would 
recognize himself or herself through interaction with a parent. 
Later, this theme was expanded by Erikson (1968) [3], who 
considered a well-developed sense of identity as a necessary 
condition for both a successfully functioning individual and 
society. Erikson highlighted the dysfunctional states of 
confusion, crisis, and panic that can arise from a crisis of 
identity. Erikson saw a strong sense of identity as a generator 
of energy, and a weak or confused sense of identity as a source 
of decline. As a crisis of identity develops, powerful negative 
identity factors are produced that can create a hatred of 
“otherness” (Erikson, 1968: 62) [3].  
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Language is a fundamental component of identity—
“Language expresses the collective experience of a group” 
(Herder in Smith, 1981: 45) [7]—and is a collective right 
(Kymlicka, 1995 [8], Breton, 1997: 47) [9]. Meanwhile, 
collective language grief has been shown to be a powerful 
motivation in communities that either have lost or fear losing 
their language (Bostock, 1997) [10]. 
II. MECHANISMS OF CHANGE
Durkheim (1970: 124) [11] described the mechanism by 
which collective consciousness—including a sense of 
identity—arises as reciprocity: “men in union can mutually 
transform one another by their reciprocal influence.” Durkheim 
viewed the process as one of representations being passed by 
contagion. 
Another mechanism of change in national identity is 
collective trauma, which operates by changing the existing ties 
between survivors (Myers, 1999: 2) [12]. Among individuals, it 
has been recognized that stress can be a cause or trigger of 
mental disorder; thus, when stress is widespread throughout a 
community, a significant change in the national identity can be 
predicted (Cawte, 1973) [13]. At the collective level, it is well 
recognized that major traumatic events or continuing 
conditions of extreme stress—such as in the Polish ghettos 
under Nazi control—can produce heightened incidence of 
suicide and other indicators of mental illness (Bostock, 1995) 
[14]. 
Another mechanism of change is the feedback loop. In their 
study of an industrial plant, Voyer, Gould, and Ford (1999) 
[15] found that many efforts to reduce organizational anxiety
were counterproductive because of the action of reinforcing
feedback loops between the various elements of collectively-
held attitudes and perceptions. Some of these loops were
balancing feedback loops, which had the effect of reducing
anxiety and moving the organization towards achieving
equilibrium (its position before a stressful event). Thus, anxiety
over national identity can be increased or decreased through the
mechanism of feedback. Voyer, Gould, and Ford (1999: 3) [15]
demonstrated that, in one organization, the leader’s role was
the only balancing feedback loop—an indication of the
importance of leaders in managing the level of anxiety in a
society.
The common element in the various mechanisms of change 
in national identity—reciprocity, contagion, or feedback 
loop—is communication. For this reason, it is clear that 
language plays an indispensable role in causing changes in the 
state of a national identity. 
It is possible to develop some descriptions of the emotions 
underlying a community’s sense of identity. In addition to fear, 
anxiety, memory, consciousness, habituation to genocide, 
trauma, grief, guilt, retribution, and paranoia, one could 
propose security/insecurity, fear of others, and habituation/non-
habituation to violence. 
Thus, it is possible to describe the state of national identity 
both relative to other communities and in terms of changes to 
itself at an earlier time, as a condition of being either adjusted 
to its circumstances or disturbed. 
III. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A DISTURBED
NATIONAL IDENTITY 
The presence of a disturbed sense of national identity state 
has an essential role in the great questions of the existence and 
survival of human society: order or conflict, peace or war, 
accommodation or genocide. The precise nature of the link 
between identity and behavior is an age-old question of 
responsibility, which will always remain unresolved. Another 
way of looking at the same problem is to say that antisocial 
behavior may not be a result of illness: 
harm to society … should not be part of the definition of 
mental illness,  because to include it would open the door to 
saying that, for example, all rapists and all those who oppose 
society’s aims are mentally ill. (Collier, Longmore, and 
Harvey, 1991: 314) [16] 
However, it is obvious that large-scale violence does 
require large numbers of willing participants; therefore, 
similarity of motivation, ontology, information supply, and 
interpretation must be assumed. 
When a large number of people collectively show 
aggression, it can be a product of a manipulated sense of 
national identity. Such aggression can be engineered by the 
controlled supply of information and interpretation that is used 
to generate collective anxiety. Lake and Rothchild (1996: 1) 
{17] expanded on this theme: 
As groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and 
difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain 
within them the potential for tremendous violence … Ethnic 
activists and political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, 
build upon these fears of insecurity and polarise society. 
Many studies of organized violence do not attribute all 
causality to leadership, as there must be facilitating followers 
or at least acquiescence from bystanders (Staub, 1989: 23) [10]. 
Further, there is very likely a situation where the “raw 
material” of collective grievances are present (Bostock, 1997) 
[11]. Thus, it is possible to believe that the impulse to 
aggressive behaviors, culminating in homicidal and suicidal 
acts (the two often being related), can be a product of a 
disturbed sense of identity.  
In light of this discussion, it is clear that individuals and 
groups may try to manage national identity through various 
techniques—especially language policy—by using language to: 
(i) define the boundaries of a collectivity, (ii) identify the
collectivity through its prevailing ontology, and (iii) adjust
feelings—particularly fears, doubts, and uncertainties—for
their own purposes. As Shohamy (2006: 77) [19] stated:
authorities will often use propaganda and ideologies about 
language loyalty, patriotism, collective identity and the need 
for “correct and pure language” or “native language variety” 
as strategies for continuing their control and holding back the 
demands of these “others.” 
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IV. LANGUAGE POLICY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
As aforementioned, language policy is one area in which 
rulers attempt to create and manage the national identity of a 
community, nation, or international body. Thus, it is 
appropriate here to consider a small number of case studies and 
then draw some general conclusions. 
A. Nazi Germany’s Language Policy
Under a regime committed to creating a heightened sense
of national identity through the use of violence in every aspect 
of life, it is unsurprising that language policy was included in 
Nazi Germany, both by intention and effect (Klemperer, 1996) 
[20].  
The aims of Nazi language policy were the politicization of 
the German language, language purism, and Germanization in 
the occupied territories. Politicization meant that language was 
seen as just another instrument of often-crude policy 
manipulation of semantics and syntax (Klemperer, 1996 [20]; 
Grunberger, 1971: Ch. 21) [21]. The whole ensemble of 
politicized Germany has been called “Nazi Deutsch” (Lane and 
Rupp, 1978: xxvii) [22]. Purism saw the removal of words, 
phrases, and concepts from the language if considered un-
German or un-Aryan. This included many famous French 
dishes and the Hertz—a unit of physical measurement 
(Grunberger, 1971: 328) [21]. There was also control of 
language through control of the media, such as the directive of 
the German Government of October 1941 that required that 
Soviet troops only be referred to by journalists as “Bolshevics, 
beasts and animals” (Young, 1991: 108) [23]. 
Within countries occupied by the Third Reich, German was 
the official language, yet proclamations announcing curfews, 
lists of deportees scheduled for transport, and lists of hostages 
for execution were published in bilingual versions. In Poland, 
the country was divided into a Généralgouvernement, which 
had a measure of self-government, and that part included into 
the greater Third Reich. The latter part of the country was to be 
Germanized, requiring that the Polish language be barred from 
administration, education, and even entertainment, with a view 
to making German the sole language of the city (Dobroszycki, 
1984: xxiii-xxiv) [24]. For example, the name of the city of 
Lodz was changed to Litzmannstadt (Dobroszycki, 1984: xxiii) 
[24]—an example of an attempt to achieve identity change 
through language policy.  
The Jewish languages of Yiddish and Hebrew and the 
Roma language of Romany do not appear to have been targeted 
for removal in any way separate from the disappearance of the 
speakers themselves, in that there was never any idea that the 
people might be permitted to live but without their languages. 
These languages were tolerated in the ghettos; however, no 
letter of the Hebrew alphabet could ever be seen to frank a 
German postage stamp while being handled by ghetto post 
offices (Hilberg, 1961: 156) [25]. Further, schools were not 
permitted to teach German to the so-called “inferior race” [25]. 
Nazi language policy demonstrates an attempt to inflate the 
purified German national identity through the delusion of a 
hypothetical language purity—or “Volks language”—
reinforced with an enhanced and deluded sense of language 
exclusivity. Downgrading the languages of captured people 
indicates an intention to induce among them a modified 
national identity state of insecurity, depression, exclusion, and 
habituation to violence. Further evidence of intention can be 
seen in banning Jewish children from the right to receive 
education in the German language. Further, the forcible 
removal of words and names deemed to be “non-Aryan” from 
the official version of the German language suggests a desire to 
habituate the German people to a state of acceptance of 
violence—initially at the verbal level, in preparation for later at 
the physical level.  
B. Language Policy in Sri Lanka
The civil war in Sri Lanka began in 1983 and ended in
2009, after claiming a probable total of 110,000 lives (BBC, 
2016) [26]. It also created large population displacement, led to 
systematic sexual violence against women, and caused severe 
and widespread post-traumatic stress (Somasundaram, 2010) 
[27]. 
There is clearly evidence of a disturbed national identity, 
but it is important to consider the extent to which language is 
implicated. Sri Lanka is a plural society where the majority 
group is the Sinhalese, who came from Northern India in the 
sixth century BCE and conquered the Veddas—the original 
inhabitants. The Sinhalese speak Sinhala, are mostly Buddhist, 
and today number 15 million (75 per cent of the population). 
The largest minority is the Tamils, who today number 3 million 
and speak Tamil. They are mainly Hindu in religion and form 
two groups: the Sri Lankan Tamils, who are descendants of the 
Tamil-speaking groups who migrated from South India as 
many as 1,000 years ago, and the Indian Tamils, who are 
descendants of the comparatively recent immigrants who came 
from India in the time of the British to work in tea and other 
plantations. There are also Muslims (known as “Moors”) and 
Christians of Sinhalese, Tamil, and other origins. The Sinhalese 
introduced Buddhism from India in the third century BCE, and 
the island became a major center of Buddhist activity. 
However, more recent settlers were Arabic peoples, followed 
by the Portuguese, Dutch, and British. 
The transfer of power from the British to self-government 
was “smooth and peaceful” (de Silva, 1981: 461) [28]; 
however, later events were to prove less serene. From 1948 to 
1956, for a brief period in 1960, and from 1965 to 1970, the 
country was ruled (in its own right or in coalition) by the 
United National Party, which was concerned with protecting 
the rights of the Tamils. The socialist Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP), created in 1951 by Solomon Bandaranaike, advocated 
national heritage, yet gained the support of groups advocating 
the recognition of Sinhala as the sole official language and 
Buddhism as the official religion. The SLFP won office in 
1956 and remained in power until 1965, except for a brief 
period in 1960, and in coalition with a minor party (the Lanka 
Sama Samaj Party) in 1964. 
In 1978, some limited recognition was given to the Tamil 
language, yet violence continued. In 1981, after a period of 
strikes and unrest, an emergency was declared and the unrest of 
this period marked the beginning of the civil war. The 
government attempted to seal northern areas from contact with 
Tamil Nadu—the southern State of India, from where the 
Tamil secessionists were being supplied—and, in 1986, 
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internecine fighting broke out between the two main Tamil 
groups: the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (also known as the “Tamil 
Tigers”). The latter group subsequently became dominant. 
After a campaign based on a promise to end the civil war, 
the election to office of President Kumaratunga in 1994 was 
followed by a truce that broke down in 1995. It was a civil war 
of attempted resolution through power that was characterized 
by a very high level of violence against civilians. Both 
politicians and members of the public were often 
indiscriminately caught in bomb blasts, thereby generating 
widespread collective fear.  
Frequent political assassination is a major manifestation of 
a condition that can be interpreted as a severely disturbed 
national identity. In Sri Lanka, political assassination has been 
a persistent mode of the system’s operation, and many leaders 
have been killed. This reflects the intensity of the political 
process in this deadly theatre of politics. Political violence 
through rioting and mass killings indicative of a collective 
habituation to violence were a feature of Sri Lankan politics 
that spread throughout all levels of society. The 1983 ethnic 
violence against the Tamils of Colombo, in which hundreds 
were killed, was a particularly clear manifestation of the 
breakdown of the state. Government response was the frequent 
use of a State of Emergency—a situation in which normal 
democratic processes are suspended. 
The movement of large numbers of people within a state 
and from a state can also be interpreted as a symptom of a 
disturbed national identity. Highly contagious and realistically-
based fear of endemic violence is the major causal factor, and 
the displaced people are those individuals whose psychic needs 
of security, dignity, and fraternity—the normal functions of 
identification—are not being supplied by the national identity. 
Since 1983, between 500,000 and 1 million people have left Sri 
Lanka (CIA World Factbook, 2016) [29].  
1) The Language Factor: During the period of British rule,
the Sri Lankan population was generally unified under an 
independence movement, and there was a Swabhasha 
movement for Sri Lanka’s “own language,” which embraced 
both Sinhala and Tamil (Edwards, 1985: 179) [30]. However, 
after independence, the communities drew further apart and 
became divided on the lines of language, religion, culture, and 
economic position, in which the Tamils had formerly received 
favored treatment under the British. Following independence, it 
appears that a single Sri Lankan national identity was difficult 
to create, and the situation resulted in separate Sinhalese and 
Tamil national identities, founded on their respective 
languages. 
It has been argued that: 
(t)hough other factors also propelled Sri Lanka’s descent into
the maelstrom, language policy, and the effort to assert ethnic
dominance that it epitomised, did the greatest harm of all. 
(Neier, 1996: 140) [31] 
There is a difference of family with regard to Sri Lanka’s 
two major languages. Sinhala is an Indo-Aryan language 
descended from Sanskrit. Its script is one of the many variants 
of the Indic system that is used throughout India (Devanagari, 
Malayalam, Tamil, and so forth) and very widely in Southeast 
Asia. Its similarities in script to other languages 
notwithstanding, Sinhala is now geographically isolated. Long 
separated from its distant relatives in Northern India, Sinhala is 
spoken by 14 million Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, but is not widely 
used outside the country. 
In contrast, Tamil is one of the major languages of southern 
India and one of India’s 15 Schedule Languages or official 
languages. It is one of the oldest of the Dravidian languages 
and is spoken by over 60 million people in India—mainly in 
Tamil Nadu—and has a sizeable number of speakers in 
Malaysia, Singapore, Fiji, Mauritius, Trinidad, Guyana, and 
East Africa (Katzner, 1977: 199) [32], as well as its 3 million 
speakers in Sri Lanka.  
Unlike the Sinhalese, for whom language and religion are 
inextricably bound, for the Tamils, language is paramount, 
while religion is not as central to ethnic identity (de Silva, 
1986: 216) [28]. The fact that Tamil nationalists in the Indian 
state of Tamil Nadu actively resisted the efforts of the national 
government to introduce Hindi as India’s national language (de 
Silva, 1986: 4) [28] was not unnoticed by Sri Lanka’s 
communities of Tamils. Many of these people saw themselves 
as being engaged in a similar struggle; thus, it is possible to see 
collective Sinhalese language insecurity reacting to collective 
Tamil language insecurity, and then escalating in a chain 
reaction of collective paranoia. 
The feeling of isolation of their language is relevant to 
understanding the political imperative of the Sinhalese to 
safeguard and strengthen its position. As a writer of Sri Lanka 
Tamil origin stated, “The Sinhala language … was in danger of 
extinction—and with it the Sinhala people. Where else in the 
world was Sinhala spoken but in Ceylon?” (Sivanandan, 1990: 
217) [33]. It has also been reported that there was insecurity
related to religion among Sinhalese activists, one of whom
stated, “if they didn’t do something there would be no more
Buddhism and no more Sinhalese—they’d all be Hindu priests,
speaking in Tamil” (Horowitz, 1985: 176) [34]. In the case of
Sri Lanka, language both reinforced religion and was
reinforced by religion, as de Silva (1993: 7) [28] observed:
“Buddhism and the destiny of the Sinhala language were so
closely intertwined that it was virtually impossible to treat
either in isolation from the other.” Thus, the language issue
came to dominate the process of politics following
independence.
It is significant that an attempt to address the language issue 
was a feature of the Indo-Lankan Peace Accord signed between 
the governments of India and Sri Lanka in 1987, in that Tamil 
was at last given equal official status to Sinhala. However, this 
belated step was not sufficient to remove the underlying causes 
of the civil war (Mathew and Barbu, 2010) [35]. The issue of 
language conflict also involves a conflict of cultural values. 
Kapferer (2012) [36] argued that there are myths of Buddhist 
triumphalism propagated through the Sinhalese education 
system. Government attempts to create ethnic quotas have 
further exacerbated the ethnolinguistic conflict. Horowitz 
(1985: 180) [34] reported a study of cultural stereotypes—
admittedly from several generations ago, but possibly still 
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relevant today—in which Sinhalese viewed themselves as 
“kind, good and religious,” but twice as lazy as the Tamils, 
who they saw as “cruel and arrogant,” as well as “diligent and 
thrifty.” Even the historical existence of collective stereotypes 
is a factor undermining the chance to successfully construct a 
single inclusive national identity. 
Thus, the proposition that Sri Lanka’s “descent into the 
maelstrom” was a product of a certain type of language policy 
and a desire for ethnic dominance appears to be validated, with 
the result of Sri Lanka still retaining a deeply disturbed and 
divided national identity. 
C. Language Policy in South Africa
The African continent has a high level of sociolinguistic
complexity, with more than half the world’s surviving 
languages found there, and over 5,000 language names 
identified in Sub-Saharan Africa (Spencer, 1985: 387) [37]. 
South Africa has nine major African languages that are spoken 
by 67 per cent of the country’s population of 50 million. 
However, not until the achievement of majority role in 1994 
did these languages have official status, which had been 
reserved for Afrikaans and English—even though these 
languages were themselves very much the subject of policy. 
Following colonization by Europeans, the Dutch language 
was brought to southern Africa in 1652, and continued to have 
some official recognition after the takeover of the Cape Colony 
by the British in 1814, when the English language became 
official. When the Union of South Africa was created in 1910 
as an independent dominion within the British Empire, Dutch 
was given equal status with English. As a result of its isolation 
from The Netherlands and its contact with African languages, 
Malay, English, French, and Portuguese, the seventeenth-
century form of Dutch became transformed into a new 
language called Afrikaans sometime between 1800 and 1850. 
Afrikaans was initially viewed disparagingly by both English 
and Dutch speakers, yet it gradually gained respectability. In 
1875, a group of teachers and clerics in the Cape founded a 
Society of True Afrikaners to stand for “our language, our 
nation, our land” (Worden, 1995: 88) [38]. They produced a 
newspaper written in Afrikaans and stressed the uniqueness of 
their God-given destiny (Worden, 1995: 88) [37]. In 1918, a 
secret society was established—the Afrikaner Broederbond. By 
1929, this society was instrumental in creating the Federation 
of Afrikaner Cultural Associations, with the purpose of 
unifying Afrikaners and propagating a strong sense of 
language, culture, religion, and race-based identity among 
them. In the meantime, in 1925, Afrikaans replaced Dutch as 
the equal and sole official language of South Africa alongside 
English—a situation that continued until majority rule. 
1) Language Policy under Minority Rule: South Africa’s
period of minority rule can be viewed as comprising tension 
between races, but also between Afrikaners and white South 
Africans of British background, with the languages of Dutch 
and then Afrikaans and English the subject of conflict as the 
vehicles of identity within their respective identities. This was 
particularly meaningful for Afrikaners because: “(I)n 
nationalist thinking, the people’s very existence was 
manifested in the ‘living language’ of Afrikaans” (Giliomee, 
1997: 122) [39]. The period was also an interface between the 
colonial languages and the vernaculars. While tolerating 
African languages, the British were reluctant to spread English 
because of the political implications of possible mobilization 
through the common medium of communication, and a desire 
to “maintain the linguistic distance between the Englishman 
and his coloured subject, as a way of maintaining the social 
distance between them” (Mazrui, 1988: 98) [40]. 
After the Afrikaners became dominant through minority 
rule in South Africa in 1948, they used language policy as an 
important component in the total range of policies designed to 
halt the “Westernization” of the African population. As Mazrui 
(1988: 90) [40] noted: “Language policy was part of this 
deceleration of the westernizing process. Afrikaners preferred 
‘Bantu Education’ as a device of keeping Africa ‘African’ and 
while power supreme!” (Mazrui, 1988: 90). A central feature of 
Bantu Education—the education policy of the Afrikaner-
dominated Nationalist Government—was a policy called 
“mother-tongue education,” which required that education for 
Africans be presented in Afrikaans up to and including tertiary 
level (Bunting, 1969: 273) [41]. This policy caused much 
distress, and an official commission in 1963 received reports 
from an overwhelming majority of witnesses that “the standard 
of English had declined considerably and was still 
deteriorating” (Bunting, 1969: 273) [40]. Education policy 
attempted to steer Africans towards Afrikaans, in what 
appeared to increasingly be a choice between Afrikaans and 
English, where Afrikaans was seen as a symbol of white 
oppression and a language of racial claustrophobia, whereas 
English was seen as a language of Pan-African communication 
(Mazrui, 1988: 90) [40]. 
The issuing of an order for black school pupils to be taught 
in Afrikaans, rather than English, triggered the explosive 1976 
Soweto riots, in which 600 people died. In addition, as the 
“homelands” created under the apartheid policy accepted “self-
government,” they gradually selected English and an 
indigenous language as their official languages (Giliomee, 
1997: 123) [39]. As the future for Afrikaans began to appear 
insecure, a new ally was found among the mixed-race people—
a predominantly Afrikaans-speaking group almost as numerous 
as the Afrikaners themselves. In this manner, after 36 years of 
excluding mixed-race people from the Afrikaner collectivity, 
the ruling National Party changed its definitional criteria of an 
Afrikaner to include anyone who spoke Afrikaans (Schiff, 
1996: 219) [42]. 
Thus, it is possible to interpret South African language 
policy under minority rule as an attempt to control national 
identity by division into a multiplicity of separate national 
identities, with the overall aim of securing and enhancing the 
future of one group at the expense of the others. For black 
people, through mother-tongue education and not offering 
education in English, this policy sought to create a national 
identity of insecurity, depression, dampened sense of realism, 
exclusion, and habituation to violence. For South Africans of 
British background, this policy aimed to create feelings of 
insecurity, depression, and a hint of the likelihood of violence, 
yet offered the possibility of inclusion in the Afrikaner identity 
as a viable strategy. Among Afrikaners, the policy sought to 
create a mental state of a secure future and mood of elation 
through the delusion of a God-given destiny, based on an 
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unrealistic belief in the sustainable viability of a policy of 
excluding Africans, underlain with a habituation to a political 
subtext of the ever-present threat of violence. 
The explanation of how South Africa changed from 
minority to majority rule has been the subject of much analysis 
(Giliomee, 1997) [39], yet it can be argued that language policy 
has played a substantial role by offering Afrikaners and their 
language of Afrikaans a secure place in the “rainbow nation.” 
2) South African Language Policy after Majority Rule:
The Constitution of the new South Africa was adopted in 1996, 
and Section 6 of Chapter 1 (“Founding Provisions”) established 
the principles of policy regarding language. It recognized 11 
official languages and stated that practical and positive 
measures must be taken to elevate the status and advance the 
use of the indigenous languages, while “all official languages 
must enjoy parity of esteem and be treated equitably” (South 
Africa, 1997: 1) [43]. The estimated numbers of speakers of 
each language as a home language are as follows: Afrikaans: 
6.8 million; English: 4.8 million; IsiNdebele: 1 million; 
IsiXhosa: 8.1 million; IsiZulu: 11.5 million; Sepedi: 4.6 
million; Sesotho: 3.8 million; Setswana: 4 million; SiSwati: 1.2 
million; Tshivenda: 1.2 million; and Xitsonga: 2.2 million 
(Statistics South Africa, Census, 2011) [44].  
Although all official languages are constitutionally equal, 
there are great differences in demography, written literature, 
and international use, which make it difficult to assess the 
effect of this new language policy. However, two interesting 
questions arise: (i) Why did the Afrikaner-dominated minority 
government yield without a struggle to majority rule—or 
“surrender without defeat,” as stated by Giliomee (1997) 
[39]—bearing in mind the likely effect on their language? (ii) 
Why did the African National Congress (ANC)–led majority 
government adopt such a generous policy towards Afrikaans 
under the circumstances? The answers to these questions are 
related and concern the management of national identities. 
Much has been written describing the national identity of 
Afrikaners as comprising a collective fear of loss of identity 
through loss of language. As Giliomee (1997: 123) [39] 
described: 
there was every prospect that a black government would 
elevate English to the status of being the sole official 
language, spelling the end of Afrikaans and the Afrikaner 
culture—and with it the demise of the Afrikaner people. 
The choice of newly-independent Namibia to make English 
its sole official language—though with recognition of 
educational rights in other languages was not unnoticed by 
Afrikaners. In fact, the South West Africa People’s 
Organization had long made it clear that Afrikaans—the lingua 
franca of Namibia—would be replaced by English (Phillipson, 
Skutnabb-Kangas, and Africa, 1986: 78) [45]. 
The ANC-led government could well have followed a 
policy of language retribution towards Afrikaans, destroying 
the language through abolishing its status. However, it instead 
chose to follow a path of status enhancement for the nine 
indigenous languages, while offering Afrikaans a continued 
place as an official language in the new South Africa. In other 
words, the choice for Afrikaners was between a policy of 
limited status reduction or a freefall into ultimate oblivion. 
Thus, the post-apartheid position offered to Afrikaners was 
one of some security, limited depression, an end to delusion, 
some inclusion, and a reduced prospect of violence—with 
language policy making a significant contribution to this. In 
other words, this was an offer far better than might have been 
expected. The promotion of Ubuntu—a traditional African 
communal practice of common humanity (Kamwangamalu, 
1999) [46], as embodied in the proposed and later realized 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission—provided an additional 
mechanism for inclusion in the new national identity. 
The future role of language policy in the development of 
South African national identity will be critical. The fears 
aroused by the ANC-led government’s refusal to grant 
approval to either exclusive mother-tongue education or single-
language schools and universities (Giliomee, 1997: 137) [39] 
have created one area of tension. Another cause of major 
concern is the effect of the “all-mighty English language” on 
the survival of all other languages, which might result in 
skepticism about the “rainbow nation” (Beukes, 2004) [47]. In 
light of the above discussion, it appears that the maintenance 
and development of the South African state depends on the 
emergence of a new sense of national identity, to which 
language policy can continue making a large contribution by 
avoiding linguistic exclusion. 
V. CONCLUSION: LANGUAGE POLICY AND
NATIONAL IDENTITY 
This article has sought to establish that the many attitudes, 
beliefs, feelings, and practices that together comprise national 
identity are strongly influenced by language policy. Individuals 
and groups—particularly those in positions of power—seek to 
create and manage national identity through language policy by 
using language to: (i) define the nation, (ii) identify the nation, 
and (iii) manage feelings—particularly fears, doubts, and 
uncertainties, but also security about the future. 
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